But some commentators have raised questions about the full legal implications of such an agreement.  In particular, the BIT could turn many American and Chinese regulatory decisions into arbitrable investment disputes.

A BIT typically permits aggrieved foreign investors to seek compensation for unfair or inequitable regulatory treatment in arbitration instead of host country domestic courts.  Such an agreement with China would mark the first time that the United States has signed a BIT with a substantial foreign investor and opened the possibility of litigating American regulatory decisions before international arbitrators.  With large scale regulatory reform on the horizon, particularly in the financial sector which has substantial Chinese investment, this possibility raises complex sovereignty questions.

In addition, arbitration of American regulatory disputes raises the tricky question of compliance with an adverse decision.  The United States has typically treated BIT’s as self-executing treaties, but Congress would have to approve the payment of adverse judgments.  Domestic political considerations would make such authorization unpalatable, and any failure to pay could jeopardize the overall BIT framework.

As of now, the parties have reached no agreement, and the U.S. Senate would have to ratify any BIT before it took effect.  But, as several commentators have noted, the issues surrounding a U.S.-China BIT merit careful scrutiny.

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Archbishop Desmond Tutu will participate by video, along with Yasmin Sooka of the Foundation for Human Rights, South Africa, Susan Bissell, Global Chief of Child Protection for UNICEF, Sharanjeet Parmar of Global Rights, and Jens Meierhenrich of the Harvard University Department of Government.

Harvard Law School Dean Martha Minow will moderate.  The event will take place in the Ames Courtroom in Austin Hall from 12:00 – 1:00 pm.

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However, less than two weeks after the signing of the treaty, there are reports that the Sudanese government has begun an offense against other rebel groups in Darfur. These clashes have given weight to demands by NGOs and other international observers that the central government include other militant groups in the peace treaty process. It is unclear whether such a proposal would be feasible, as Jem has threatened to leave the peace talks if other rebel groups are included. As a result, despite the new treaty, the prospects for peace in Darfur remain uncertain.

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South Korea’s options in responding to this incident are limited. Seoul’s right to military retaliation is constrained by the ongoing border dispute. The end of the Korean War never produced a peace treaty, and the North and South have technically been observing a truce since 1953. The North has never accepted the current sea boundary, a UN-drawn border called the northern limit line, and its ships regularly stray into waters controlled by the South. In this context, the South cannot make an undisputed claim that its territory was invaded.

South Korea’s options for less direct action are similarly constrained. While the South could initiate economic sanctions and asset-freezing, it believes that such measures could add to the desperate poverty of the North’s citizens and slow the recent détente between the two countries. In a sign that the confrontation has not altered trade relationships, a North Korean freighter was allowed to enter South Korean waters yesterday on its way to Incheon. Meanwhile, any attempt to arbitrate the dispute before an international body would require the consent of one of the most isolationist regimes in the world.

The North has a history of initiating skirmishes in order to escalate pressure before major regional events; the last time the countries clashed was in 2002, while the South was hosting the World Cup. In this case, analysts believe, the North may be trying to send a message to President Obama, who is currently visiting the region and is scheduled to arrive in Seoul on Wednesday. North Korea wants a formal peace treaty to replace the 1953 truce, including reconsideration of disputed territory. It also wants bilateral negotiations with the U.S., which it believes could lead to its acceptance as a nuclear power. President Obama, who has made engagement with “rogue states” a cornerstone of his foreign policy, plans to send special envoy Stephen Bosworth to Pyongyang for talks over ending the North’s nuclear program.

The legal bases of Honduras’s complaint are Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter, which reserves to member states matters which are “essentially within [their] domestic jurisdiction,” and the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. As a practical matter, Honduras’s complaint is only one element of a broader political and diplomatic offensive aimed at preventing Mr. Zelaya from returning to power before the upcoming presidential elections scheduled for November 29. It is unclear whether the ICJ will agree to hear the complaint, which was filed by an interim administration that many international observers consider illegitimate. Current efforts toward national reconciliation may also determine whether the case goes forward.

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In the area of Agriculture, members are discussing market access issues with regard to tariff caps and tariff-rate quotas, while also developing a template for scheduling commitments. Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) deliberations are occurring in several different formats, with both text-based debate and open-ended discussion over non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade.

Services discussions will now focus on domestic regulation through intensified text-based negotiations. Meanwhile, the Rules Group is honing in on anti-dumping and subsidies guidelines as well as regional trade agreements (RTAs). Deliberation on geographic identifications (GIs) for wine and spirits will also be more focused as members address four specific questions posed by the chair to encourage progress.

A new trade facilitation agreement is under formulation as members work to consolidate General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Articles for further negotiation. Additionally, the Committee on Trade and Environment Special Session (CTESS) has allowed members to discuss environmental goods and services during a September workshop and is now encouraging members to highlight environmental goods of interest.

Small Group negotiations will continue on the Monitoring Mechanism for Special and Differential Treatment, occasionally requiring open-ended meetings for group debriefing. The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) will now discuss post-retaliation and compliance, having addresses transparency, amicus briefs and remand earlier this year.

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The central dispute at the remedies stage concerned whether Canada had to retrospectively compensate for the overshipping that occurred in the period prior to the initiation of arbitration, or whether prospective rectification of its calculations after July 2007 would sufficiently remedy the violation. According to Article XIV:22 of the SLA, if the LCIA finds that a party has breached the Agreement, it shall identify a reasonable time period for curing the breach, up to 30 days from the Award. If the breaching party “fails to cure the breach within a reasonable period of time,” the SLA states that the LCIA shall determine “appropriate adjustments” to the export restrictions to compensate for the breach.  According to Article XIV:24, these adjustments apply from the end of the reasonable time period until the breach has been cured.

The LCIA, approaching the SLA as a stand-alone agreement in international law rather than as an agreement made under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), held that retrospective remedies were appropriate in this case. Although it referred to the WTO DSU for comparative purposes, it cited the ILC Draft Articles and the Chorzow Factory to establish a presumption in international law in favor of retrospective remedies and found nothing contrary to this in the SLA.

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Greek Cypriot leader Dimitris Christofias and Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat agreed in May of last year to work towards “a bicommunal, bizonal federation with political equality.” Under the proposed plan, a unified federal government with govern over two Constituent States with equal power. The most sensitive subject of the negotiation is how to compensate property owners who have suffered losses as a result of the conflict between the two groups.  It is estimated that around 265,000 Cypriots lost their homes after fleeing during the 1960s and 70s.

The two sides will meet again on March 11th to address issues pertaining to the European Union. Cyprus joined the EU in 2004 and is represented there by the Greek Cypriot government. The EU has urged Turkey to encourage the reunification of Cyprus.

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Belgium alleges that since that time Senegal has denied a number of requests to prosecute Habré. A complaint was filed in Senegal in 2000, which led to Habré being placed under house arrest after being indicted for “crimes against humanity, acts of torture, and barbarity.” However, he has not been criminally prosecuted; Senegalese officials claim that it is a lack of funds that has prevented a trial from moving forward. A similar complaint was raised against Habré in Belgian courts in 2001. Belgium issued an international arrest warrant in 2005, but Senegal has taken no action on that warrant.

After repeated attempts at negotiation and arbitration over the last several years, Belgium brought its case to the ICJ, citing a violation of the UN Convention against Torture. Belgium requested that the Court require Senegal to bring criminal proceedings against Habré, or to extradite him to Belgium. Additionally, Belgian officials asked the ICJ to take provisional measures to ensure that Habré remains under police supervision. Senegalese President Wade has made public comments stating that if the money could not be found for Habré’s trial, he would be released from house arrest.

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In order to decide how to create the boundary, the Court first drew a provisional equidistant line.  It then looked for other factors including disproportion in the lengths of the coasts, any division already affected in the reason, the conduct of the parties (including fishing rights and natural resource rights) and security considerations. Finally, the Court verified that the new line would not lead to inequitable results for either party.

Both countries submitted arguments and maps showing how they thought the line should be drawn and submitted “base points” that they thought the line should follow. Ultimately, the ICJ largely discounted the arguments of both sides in drawing their final boundary. Romania was given a larger share of the disputed area, but Ukraine was given a large part of the northeast side of Romania’s original claim.

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