Taking the recent Kiobel decision as a starting point, this article examines the ramifications of the majority opinion with respect to corporate accountability in conflict zones, both in the ATS context and more generally. The article contends that Kiobel is out of step with the historical tradition of the international legal system to fill governance gaps, including by holding actors operating in conflict zones accountable for egregious violations of human rights when domestic systems fail to do so.
Creative lawyering goes beyond knowledge of the applicable law to include understanding local culture and customs, understanding the company’s strategy and risk tolerances, being mindful of corporate reputation, gathering relevant prior experience, and being willing to act as the conscience of the company. To address known and unknown risk conditions, companies and their lawyers can look to a number of guiding principles to shape decisions and responses.
This article explores the role of new governance structures that have been utilized to address supply chain–related labor and human rights abuses. More specifically, it examines the utility of multi-stakeholder fora to address such problems. It argues that such multi-stakeholder fora, including multi-stakeholder initiatives, provide a number of advantages when addressing global supply chain–related issues, when compared to traditional command-and-control approaches.
The decision of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia to sentence Duch, the brutal Chairman of S-21 and the Killing Fields at Choeung Ek, to a mere nineteen years in prison exemplifies the disturbing tendency of international criminal tribunals to issue sentences of pedestrian severity to the world’s very worst criminals. This article examines the sociopolitical roots of this phenomenon. Drawing on insights from the political science literature to engage in a comparative analysis of the relationship between democracy and punishment, the article concludes that international criminal tribunals’ lenience likely stems, at least in part, from excessive insulation from, and insensitivity to, democratic pressures.
In this interview, Larry D. Johnson ‘70 (Adjunct Professor, Columbia Law School, formerly UN Assistant-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs from 2006–2008 and Chef de Cabinet, Office of the President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia from 2003–2005) discusses his experience working for various international institutions, the pressing issues facing the United Nations and as-hoc tribunals, and the course he is currently teaching, “Constitutional Law of the United Nations.”