Harvard ILJ

[This article] argues that India and China’s antidumping regimes pose a larger long-term threat to the global trade regime than is commonly believed. Through novel empirical tests of the two leading theories, I demonstrate why China and India’s recent increase in antidumping protectionism is not temporary and not destined to level off.

This Article . . . demonstrat[es] both that the best reading of the Rome Statute is that states are permitted to prosecute international crimes as ordinary crimes and that discouraging states from prosecuting international crimes as ordinary crimes is counterproductive, because national prosecutions of ordinary crimes are far more likely to succeed than national prosecutions of international crimes. This Article then defends an alternative theory of complementarity that focuses exclusively on sentence.

Properly framed, the self-execution inquiry comprises two distinct questions. First, what does the treaty obligate the United States to do? This is a question of international law governed by treaty interpretation principles. Second, which government actors within the United States are responsible for domestic treaty implementation? This is a question of domestic law, not international law: treaties almost never answer this question.

Moreover, the consensus recommendation of that literature . . . is that courts can enforce socio-economic rights but should do so in a weak-form or dialogical manner, whereby they point out violations of rights but leave the remedies to the political branches . . . .Based on an indepth case study of Colombia, which draws on my extensive fieldwork within that country, and on evidence from other countries including Brazil, Argentina, Hungary, South Africa, and India, I argue that both the assumption and the consensus recommendation are wrong.

In June 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a momentous decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank, upending decades of federal appeals court precedent in transnational securities law. The Court established a bright line, transaction-based test for when Section 10(b) (“Sec. 10(b)”) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) can apply extraterritorially. . . .This has had a significant impact on securities litigation because Sec. 10(b) and its implementing regulation, Rule 10b-5, provide the most common cause of action for securities fraud in the United States.

The ice having broken so suddenly, we resolved to think about a Resolution which both Israelis and Palestinians could put to the Security Council as their Joint Proposal.

[T]his Commentary considers some possible explanations for the international community’s continuing inability to negotiate an effective agreement to crack down on firms that bribe foreign officials. The Commentary concludes by speculating that an institutionalized enforcement mechanism might provide impetus for an agreement.

This essay explores one aspect of that discussion—the determinants of effective protection—by considering three commonly held beliefs about the path to overcoming the failure of a country’s intellectual property laws to provide adequate and effective protection. Each of these ideas posits a determinant of effective IPR enforcement: The first is domestic economic interest, the second is the rule of law, and the third is political will.

Admittedly this is an immense and complicated issue, and the economics behind pharmaceutical innovation and access is but one facet of a complete understanding of the problem. This paper describes the context of the problems surrounding access to medicines, highlighting the tremendously complicated web of issues that prevent medicines from reaching the world’s poorest.

Harvard International Law Journal 2011 Symposium Developments and Challenges in International Intellectual Property Law March 25, 2011 Harvard Law School   Schedule Keynote Address: The White House Strategy for Intellectual Property in the 21st Century Victoria Espinel U.S. Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator 12:00PM -1:00PM John Chipman Gray Lunch will be served Panel 1: International Institutional Landscape [...]

In my comments I would like to emphasize some points that may not be fully accounted for in this supply-and-demand scenario.

First, while the hunt for arable land for food may explain many of the large transnational land deals, they appear to be part of a deeper structural change – the emergence of a transnational real estate market. What explains this change?

Recognizing that Hollis’ project here is not to propose a complete solution [to the threat posed by cyber attacks] but merely a framework upon which to build, I will focus my comments on four points in Hollis’ paper: proximity, frequency, technology protection, and the continuing problem of attribution. While these four points are fundamental to Hollis’ proposal, I believe that they also present some difficulties.

This Article argues that there has been an unnoticed contemporary countertrend—the “regulatory turn in international law.” Within the past two decades, states and international organizations have at an unprecedented rate entered into agreements, passed resolutions, enacted laws, and created institutions and networks, formal and informal,that impose and enforce direct and indirect international duties upon individuals or that buttress and facilitate a state’s authorities respecting those under and even beyond its territorial jurisdiction.

Individuals, shadowy criminal organizations, and nation states all currently possess the capacity to harm modern societies through computer attacks. These new and severe cyberthreats put critical information, infrastructure, and lives at risk—and the threat is growing in scale and intensity with every passing day.

The U.S. class action is an unusual animal. To the extent that its “opt out” mechanism purports to bind class members who never affirmatively commenced proceedings in the United States, controversy surrounds the question whether such a judgment is entitled to recognition in England and Wales.