Harvard ILJ

But Professor Sloss and I disagree about the source of this problematic approach. I have traced this approach to Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Foster v. Neilson. Professor Sloss traces it to courts and scholars (including me) who, in his view, have misread Foster.

[T]those who are a part of the Christian Iraqi diaspora are hesitant to return to their homeland due to the systematic violence and discrimination they have faced and may face again. Can international action or internal, government programs do anything to save Christianity in Iraq?

In my view, the argument that the ICC should focus “exclusively on sentencing” when determining whether “ordinary” crime prosecution is admissible is neither desirable nor manageable in all cases. I will focus on three aspects: The assumptions underlying the central claim, the desirability of a new methodology, and its manageability.

While Professor Heller may be successful in showing that a sentence-based approach is superior to a charge-based approach, I will argue that a sentence-based approach also raises some serious difficulties that have not been addressed. I will therefore suggest a third option, a process-based approach.

Landau’s article advances our understanding of the remedial issues he discusses. But, I believe that there are some empirical and conceptual matters that require additional exploration.

Our joint reflection seeks to bring recognition to the unparalleled bravery and sustained nonviolent resistance of Syria’s revolution and to provide concrete political means to help end the forty-two year long reign of death and fear.

In examining how intellectual property
rights can most effectively and strategically support developing countries in
implementing this ambitious and potentially catalytic agenda in enabling innovation
for global health, this paper seeks to outline a coherent and strategic approach to
address human development needs and to facilitate the harnessing of innovation and
the sharing of knowledge for global health.

[This article] argues that India and China’s antidumping regimes pose a larger long-term threat to the global trade regime than is commonly believed. Through novel empirical tests of the two leading theories, I demonstrate why China and India’s recent increase in antidumping protectionism is not temporary and not destined to level off.

This Article . . . demonstrat[es] both that the best reading of the Rome Statute is that states are permitted to prosecute international crimes as ordinary crimes and that discouraging states from prosecuting international crimes as ordinary crimes is counterproductive, because national prosecutions of ordinary crimes are far more likely to succeed than national prosecutions of international crimes. This Article then defends an alternative theory of complementarity that focuses exclusively on sentence.

Properly framed, the self-execution inquiry comprises two distinct questions. First, what does the treaty obligate the United States to do? This is a question of international law governed by treaty interpretation principles. Second, which government actors within the United States are responsible for domestic treaty implementation? This is a question of domestic law, not international law: treaties almost never answer this question.

Moreover, the consensus recommendation of that literature . . . is that courts can enforce socio-economic rights but should do so in a weak-form or dialogical manner, whereby they point out violations of rights but leave the remedies to the political branches . . . .Based on an indepth case study of Colombia, which draws on my extensive fieldwork within that country, and on evidence from other countries including Brazil, Argentina, Hungary, South Africa, and India, I argue that both the assumption and the consensus recommendation are wrong.

In June 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a momentous decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank, upending decades of federal appeals court precedent in transnational securities law. The Court established a bright line, transaction-based test for when Section 10(b) (“Sec. 10(b)”) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) can apply extraterritorially. . . .This has had a significant impact on securities litigation because Sec. 10(b) and its implementing regulation, Rule 10b-5, provide the most common cause of action for securities fraud in the United States.

The ice having broken so suddenly, we resolved to think about a Resolution which both Israelis and Palestinians could put to the Security Council as their Joint Proposal.

[T]his Commentary considers some possible explanations for the international community’s continuing inability to negotiate an effective agreement to crack down on firms that bribe foreign officials. The Commentary concludes by speculating that an institutionalized enforcement mechanism might provide impetus for an agreement.

This essay explores one aspect of that discussion—the determinants of effective protection—by considering three commonly held beliefs about the path to overcoming the failure of a country’s intellectual property laws to provide adequate and effective protection. Each of these ideas posits a determinant of effective IPR enforcement: The first is domestic economic interest, the second is the rule of law, and the third is political will.